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election in the year 2004. The statistical models developed are applications and generalizations 
of Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions. Our results suggest that the distribution of 
independent candidates can be explained well with a negative binomial probability model or its 
generalizations. Our results also help to identify three major factors behind the variations in the 
number of independent candidates. First, a major determinant of the number of independent 
candidates is political fractionalization. Results suggest that the number of non-independent 
candidates would typically lead to more independent candidates in the fray. Interestingly, our 
analysis points out that the major determinant appears to be political fractionalization at the State 
level rather than at the constituency itself. Second, we find some indirect evidence of presence of 
free riders. Free riders typically stand in urban constituencies and against the so called VIP 
candidates. Third, our results suggest that SC and ST constituencies would have typically lower 
number of independent candidates due to lack of potential candidates as compared to general 
constituencies. 
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Independent Candidates in a Parliamentary Election in India:  
A Poisson Regression Model 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In terms of scale of operation, logistics and active involvement of number of 
people, Indian parliamentary election is one of the biggest events in the world. 
Since independence in 1947, parliamentary elections have been held in India 
fifteen times. However, even with more than sixty years of democratic 
experience, results of these elections suggest that a clear bi-party system in 
India is yet to emerge at the central level.  
 
Besides the relational dynamics of different political parties, a major feature of 
Indian parliamentary elections is the number of independent candidates. During 
the 1996 parliamentary election in India, a total of 10,635 independent 
candidates appeared in a total of 543 parliamentary seats. Although in 
subsequent elections in 1998 and 2004, the numbers decreased to 1,915 and 
2,385 respectively, they are still high, especially if one considers one of the 
earliest democracies like the United Kingdom as benchmark.1   
 
This paper attempts to explain the reasons behind such high number of 
independent candidates in India and also attempts to trace its determinants.  To 
motivate the readers, we argue that the problem is important from both 
theoretical and practical perspectives. We also argue that the problem is not just 
relevant for India only, but for all democracies. 
 
In politics, an independent politician is defined as one who is not affiliated with 
any political party. Generally such a person runs in an election without the 
support of any political party. Internationally, independent candidates have 
played important roles in different countries in different stages of political 
development. In traditional democracies like the UK or Canada, independent 
candidates have won elections frequently. Independents have contributed 
significantly in the political developments in South Africa. In recent years, 
independent candidates have also played important functional roles in Russia 
and some other transitional economies in East Europe.   
 
Without the institutional support of a political party, independent candidates not 
only have to bear the risk of losing, but often also have to bear the risk of 
forfeiture of deposit. Therefore, a natural question is: what is his/her incentive?  
More importantly, we ask: what type of political environments in general, and 
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 The number of independent candidates in the 2005 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom was 
only 162 for a total of 646 seats. 
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what type of constituencies in particular, induce individuals to run as independent 
candidates? Neither standard voting theories like the median voter theory, nor 
the theories of coalition formation in democracies provide clear and unambiguous 
answers to these questions.  
 
Theories in political science and public economics have offered different reasons 
behind their success like ideological gaps created by major party competition 
(Rosenstone et al, 1996). 
 
In an ideal world, independents would hold a centrist viewpoint in a polarized 
political environment. They may also have a viewpoint based on issues that they 
do not feel that any major party addresses. Therefore, one reason for their taking 
part in electoral politics could be grievance against existing politicians and/or 
policies.2  Independent candidates could also be a former member of a political 
party and stand in election as rebels. A third category of independents are those 
who may support a political party but believe they should not formally represent it 
and thus be subject to its policies. Fourth category of independent candidates 
could be free-riders who, by paying a limited cost, enjoy and utilize the free 
publicity that elections offer them. Finally, independent candidates could be 
cranks who run for idiosyncratic reasons that are not rational at all (Canon, 1993) 
 
Whatever be the reason behind participation in an election, it is well known that 
in a politically charged atmosphere, independent candidates could play a 
decisive role in an election. Therefore, in a first-past-the-post electoral system 
where even a single vote could make the difference between the winner and the 
losers, for independent candidates, the very motive of standing in an election 
may not be winning per se, but to influence the outcome through participation. A 
major incentive here is to engage in bargaining with major political parties and 
eventually, to cut a deal with one of them in the long-run.  
 
Further, a more common-sense and traditional view is that independent 
candidates could be dummies floated by political parties themselves. These 
dummies would “clone” the major rival, the underlying idea being to create 
confusions in the mind of voters planning to vote for its rival and through this 
process, divide its votes.  
 
Internationally, there is a voluminous literature on the problems that independent 
candidates have caused. There is also a vast literature on the roles that 
independent candidates actually have or could have played in policy in different 
stages of political and economic development in a country. Majority of these 
studies are, however, in the context of developed countries with two major 
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 For example, during the assembly election in Tamil Nadu, India, in 1996, Modaurichi assembly 
constituency had 1033 candidates.  During Parliamentary elections in the same year, Nalgonda constituency 
in Andhra Pradesh and Belgaum constituency in Karnataka had 480 and 456 candidates respectively. In 
each of these cases, overwhelming majority were independent candidates and the “ballot papers” were in 
the form of a booklet. 
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political parties.3 Theoretical results point out that presence of independent 
candidates could distort the results in an election. In the context of US, 
Heckelman and Yates (2008) have shown that in the presence of independent 
candidates, two state senators will generally not be from opposite parties and will 
be closer in ideological space than if they were elected under strict two-party 
competition. Empirical analysis of senate composition carried out by the authors 
themselves from 1991 to 2002 seems to support the theory.  
 
It may, however, be noted that focus of Heckelman and Yates (2008) is on the 
outcomes of elections and not on the factors that lead to the emergence of 
independent candidates. In this paper an attempt is made to model the number 
of independent candidates in a parliamentary constituency, both theoretically and 
econometrically. 
 
Because of its lack of an effective bi-party system at the central level, India would 
be a good case to examine the roles that different factors play in the emergence 
of independent candidates. Being a large country with a lot of diversities, it is no 
surprise that different parts of India react differently to parliamentary elections. 
While many smaller units like States show signs of emergence of a bi-party 
system, politics at the central level in India is still guided by complex political 
coalitions involving both national and regional parties. One major objective of the 
paper is to examine the role political fragmentation plays in the emergence of 
independent candidates, both theoretically as well as empirically.  In a first-past-
the-post system, all political parties have incentive to float “clones”. We attempt 
to show that a major consequence of this could be a prisoners‟ dilemma type 
political game leading to a loss-loss situation for all political parties. Political 
fragmentation could worsen the situation. Therefore, common sense suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, more political fragmentation would lead to more number of 
independent candidates in a first-past-the-post electoral system.   
 
In the specific context of India, political importance of independent candidates 
has varied substantially over the years. In the Lok Sabha elections in 1962 and 
and 1967 in India, independent candidates won 20 and 35 seats respectively. 
However, since 1970s, number of seats won by independent candidates has 
decreased substantially. In the 2004 Lok Sabha election, only 5 out of 2385 
independent candidates could win. In contrast, as many as 2370 independent 
candidates lost their deposits. However, these figures do not truly reflect the 
importance of independent candidates in the political process. Independent 
candidates as a group got 4.25% of the total valid votes in the 2004 
parliamentary election in India. In a fragmented polity, these figures are not 
negligible. More importantly, in 116 constituencies out of a total of 543, the total 
number of votes that the independent candidates got as a group was more than 
the gap between the winner and his/her nearest rival. 
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 For example, Abramson et al (1995) reviews the experience with third party and independent candidates 
in the context of US presidential elections. 
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During early years of Indian democracy, the high number of independent 
candidates in an election used to cost the public exchequer in India severely.4 
Other costs like security costs were also high. If for example, an independent 
candidate died (or, was murdered), election in that constituency would be 
postponed. In a politically volatile or charged atmosphere, such a situation – 
though infrequent – happened in India.5 Although during recent years, electoral 
reforms and the use of electronic voting machines in India have taken care of 
many of these problems, it may be remembered that when coalition governance 
is the order of the day, participation of too many independent candidates may 
enhance complexity of political management. 
 
This paper attempts to provide a systematic explanation of the emergence of 
independent candidates in an election. The theoretical framework proposed by 
us focuses on “cloning” of rivals carried out by political parties through dummy 
independent candidates. We attempt to show that the “cloning”, if carried out by 
all political parties, would lead to a prisoners‟ dilemma type political game. So far 
as individual incentives are concerned, we attempt to identify a few factors which 
would induce an individual to contest a parliamentary election as an independent 
candidate.  
 
Empirically, we specify a Poisson regression framework that can take care of the 
count data properties of a series well. Poisson regression models have a number 
of attractive features for econometric applications involving count data. They 
accommodate the integer property of the count data directly and justify 
aggregation of the count variable over time. Further, the equations that are used 
for estimation of parameters in these models are surprisingly similar to more 
traditional regression models. Because of these advantages, these models and 
its generalizations (e.g., Negative Binomial regression models) have been 
applied in hundreds of studies involving count data. Earlier, these models have 
been used to explain firms‟ patents (Hausman et al, 1984), number of doctor 
consultations (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986), daily beverage consumption 
(Mullahy, 1986), daily homicide counts (Grogger, 1990), number of malpractice 
claims (Cooil, 1991) and number of book orders (Wedel et al, 1993). Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998) list many other comparatively recent references. 
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 For example, in a few cases, election commission in India had to print out ballot booklets rather than 
ballot papers. 
5
 Earlier, a rule followed by the Election Commission was that in the event of death of any candidate, the 
election would be postponed. Killing defenceless candidates to get the poll postponed was a method not 
unknown in India. For example, in the assembly polls of 1989, Nagi Reddy fought the Telugu Desam's 
Palakondarayudu at Raychoti in Cuddapah district. In the parliament polls of 1985, Palakondarayudu, who 
was then a candidate for parliament, was unsure of the support of the two main local factions that ruled 
Raychoti town. So he is said to have got an independent candidate, Guvvala Subbarayudu killed and got the 
election postponed. He thus gained time to rope in the two factions, and succeeded in winning the election 
held later. In 1989, polls were held simultaneously for assembly and parliament. Palakondarayudu was this 
time a candidate for the assembly. Apprehensive that he may repeat his victorious performance, YSR's man 
Nagi Reddy set up a pliant man of their own faction, Avula Subba Reddy by name, as an independent 
candidate, and allegedly killed him the day before the election to get the election to the assembly postponed 
(Balagopal, 2004). 
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The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic analytical 
framework. Section 3 discusses the data, carries out a brief descriptive analysis 
and presents the estimated Poisson and Negative Binomial models. To check the 
stability of the estimated coefficients, it also carries out a brief bootstrap analysis. 
Finally, Section 4 summarizes the main findings, analyzes the policy implications 
and discusses some limitations and possible generalizations of this study . 
 
 
2 The Analytical Framework 
 
Consider a constituency (say, C) with n “neutral” voters.6 For simplicity, we 
assume that (i) each “neutral” voter in C is eligible to run as an independent 
candidate, and, (ii) independent candidates in C would emerge from “neutral” 
voters within C only. 7 Further, the decision on whether to run in the election as 
an independent candidate is taken by each “neutral” voter in C independently of 
one another.   
 
Let Xk be a Bernoulli indicator random variable reflecting the choice of the k-th 
“neutral” voter in C, with P[Xk = 1] = p and P[Xk=0] = (1–p). Define Y = 

n
k
kX
1
. 
Then, Y denotes the number of independent candidates in C.  
 
Clearly, Y Binomial (n,p). However, common sense suggests that in this case n 
would be very large and p would be very small. Hence, the probability mass 
function of Y can be approximated by a Poisson () distribution, e.g.,  
 
(1)  P[Y = y] = (e– 
y )/y! 
 
where np  and E(Y) = Var(Y) =  .  
 
Traditionally, when the dependent variable is a count variable, a Poisson 
specification like (1) is often the starting point. Empirical studies, however, 
suggest that in case of count variables, mean of that variable rarely equals 
variance. Hence, a probability model with E(Y) = Var(Y) is considered too 
restrictive a specification. Rather, in empirical studies involving count data in 
cross-section, one generally encounters the problem of over-dispersion, e.g., 
E(Y) < Var(Y).  
 
In cross-section, the problem of over-dispersion could occur if the  parameter in 
(1) is not homogeneous in the population. To understand the possible factors that 
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 By “neutral” voter, we mean voters who are not members of any political party and are not 
guided by their rules and regulations.  
7
 Theoretically, any person from anywhere of India can stand in any constituency provided some 
standard formalities are met. 
  
7 
could lead to heterogeneity across constituencies, the relationship  np would 
be of help. Clearly, for a given p, if the size of “neutral” voters is different in any 
two constituencies, expected numbers of independent candidates in them would 
be different. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the more actively the population in a 
constituency takes part in the mainstream political process, the less will be the 
number of independent candidates in that constituency. Without constituency-
wise detailed data on different party memberships, it is difficult to measure the 
true impact of n on  precisely. In a few cases, however, one can observe the 
impact of n indirectly. For example, if some constituencies are reserved for 
certain categories of people, the number of potential independent candidates 
among “neutral” voters in that constituency decreases, leading to a smaller value 
of   . In case of India, some constituencies are randomly declared as SC or ST 
constituencies, reserving them respectively for scheduled castes or scheduled 
tribes. Our theory, therefore, suggests that ceteris paribus, these constituencies 
will have less number of independent candidates. 
 
The role of p as a determinant of independent candidates, in contrast, is complex 
because it interacts with n and also depends on many other factors. This is 
because individuals have different motives or incentives to run as independent 
candidates in election. Whatever be the motive, p depends on the perception of 
an individual running as an independent candidate that he/she would be able to 
affect the result and would gain from the process. It may be noted that 
effectiveness of individuals with fixed or nominal local support would increase as 
n decreases. To that extent, smaller constituencies may have more independent 
candidates as well. 
 
An important determinant of p, however, would be political fragmentation. 
Common sense suggests that if political fragmentation is high, it may even be 
possible for individuals with limited popular support to affect the outcome in an 
election as an independent candidate. Given the heterogeneity of political 
fragmentation between and within States in India, it is expected that p will vary 
substantially across constituencies.  
 
A third source of variation in p could be due to preference of particular types of 
constituencies by free riders. For example, free riders would like to target 
constituencies with VIP candidates in fray. They may also target metro or 
urbanized constituencies where media attention is likely to be more. Because of 
all these factors, the  parameter may experience considerable variation across 
constituencies, leading to over-dispersion.  
 
It may be noted that Negative Binomial distribution is a probability distribution 
that satisfies the property of over-dispersion. Hence, when one encounters over-
dispersion, Negative Binomial distribution becomes a natural starting point in 
specification. Negative Binomial specification may also be treated as a 
generalization of (1). The generalization is obtained by introducing another 
source of randomness in the Poisson distribution. If we allow the Poisson 
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parameter  to be randomly distributed across the population and assume that 
  (, ) [e.g., a Gamma distribution with parameters , and  respectively], 
then the resulting distribution turns out to be a Negative Binomial distribution with 
the following probability mass function: 
 
y
y
y
yYP 







 )1(
1)1()(
)(
][)2( 





 
 
Here, the first two moments of Y are: E(Y) =  / and Var(Y) = [ (1+)]/2. 
Therefore, the variance to mean ratio of this distribution is: 
 
(3)  Var(Y) / E(Y) = (1+)/ > 1 
 
Thus, the parameter  takes care of the phenomenon of over-dispersion 
mentioned above. Note that using the expression of the probability mass function 
of Negative Binomial in (3), one can show that the limiting case of Poisson 
distribution is reached when .  
 
In empirical studies the parameters  in case of Poisson or  and  in case of 
Negative Binomial distribution may be estimated by standard techniques like 
method of moments or maximum likelihood. Because of the availability of an 
easily interpretable closed-form solution with standard estimation techniques, the 
Negative Binomial model had been used frequently in the literature to model 
count data (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). However, in most cases, the 
specification of a Negative Binomial model is ad hoc and based on statistical 
convenience. 
 
In this paper, we show that there could also be another justification of the 
Negative Binomial specification if the problem of emergence of independent 
candidates is addressed from the perspective of political parties. To illustrate this 
point, we shall now specify a very simple model of political behavior. 
 
Suppose, there are N voters in a constituency (say, C). Suppose there are only 
two political parties, viz., P1 and P2, fighting in an election in C. For simplicity, 
assume that the number of committed voters is m for both P1 and P2, the 
remaining (N–2m) voters in the constituency, say n, are “neutral” voters. We 
assume that each party knows its own committed voters as well as those of their 
rival. An implication of this assumption is that they know that the neutral voters 
will be the deciding factor in the election. Each party assumes that in a direct 
contest, whatever be the amount spent in campaigning on behalf of their own 
candidates, each of the “neutral” voters will vote for both the candidates with 
probability (1/2).  As both P1 and P2 do not know which neutral voter will vote for 
which party, they take the total number of votes that their respective parties will 
obtain in the election as random variables Z1 and Z2 respectively. Obviously, due 
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to symmetry, P[  Z1 > Z2] = P[  Z1 < Z2], implying both P1 and P2 perceive that 
they have equal chance of winning the election. 
 
Each party now reasons in the following manner. They know that if they can float 
one or more independent candidates cloning its rival, each neutral voter will then 
vote for each such independent candidate with probability  (where  is very 
small and close to zero) at the cost of its rival. For example, if P1 floats an 
independent candidate I11 cloning the candidate for P2, each neutral voter will 
then vote with a Multinomial probability distribution (1/2, ½ - , ), where the 
probabilities respectively pertain to (P1, P2, I11). Thus, if P1 floats K such 
independent candidates, viz., I11, I12, … I1K, then (P1, P2, I11, …, I1k) will then have 
a (K+2) dimensional  Multinomial probability distribution (1/2, ½ - K, , , …). 
Of course, P2 may also think in a similar fashion and may float L independent 
candidates against P1, say, I21, I22, … I2L.  Clearly, success in the election would 
then depend upon which political party would float more “clone” independent 
candidates. 
 
The objective of each political party is to win the election at minimum cost. 
Suppose, party Pi could afford to spend at most Fi amount on floating 
independent candidates. Suppose each independent candidate costs D, which is 
same for both the parties. However, budgets on independent candidates are 
closely guarded secret and therefore, both P1 and P2 do not know how much its 
rival can spend on floating independent candidates.  
 
Then the optimization problem of party P1 is: 
 
(4)           M1 = m1  such that  m1 >0,      m1 D  F1, and, E(Z1) – E(Z2) > 0. 
                     = 0 otherwise 
 
where M1 is the number of independent candidates floated by P1. The 
optimization problem of P2 may also be expressed in a similar manner. 
 
This entire process of floating clone independent candidates may be thought of 
as a two-person simultaneous move game. The game is simultaneous because 
although in principle, each party can observe what the other one is doing for 
some time, crucial adjustments will take place only at the last moment of filing 
nomination. To maximize the chance of winning in this game, each political party 
has to guess the number of independent candidates that would be floated by its 
rival and then need to put one more clone independent candidate in addition.  
 
It may be noted that the way we have specified our model, the process of 
guessing the number of independent candidates floated by the rival is likely to be 
“memoryless”. To elaborate, suppose that through its own information network, at 
some point during the period of filing the nomination papers, P1 has come to 
know that P2 has so far floated b “clone” candidates. This information will not be 
of much use to P1 because: 
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(5)  P [ M2  > (a+b) | M2 > b ] = P [ M2 > a ] 
 
As both political parties would like to outmaneuver each other at the crucial last 
moment of filing nominations, any information obtained prior to that on the 
number of candidates floated by its rival will not be of any use. 
 
It may be noted that the property of memoryless-ness in (5) characterizes the 
Geometric distribution. Therefore, the number of independent candidates floated 
by each political party, in this case, will be a Geometric probability distribution. 
Since two political parties come to the decision of floating “clone” candidates 
independently in our model, the resulting distribution of the total number of 
independent candidates would be Negative Binomial distribution. 
 
Undoubtedly, the above model is stylized and simple. However, we now discuss 
implications of some of the assumptions and also attempt some generalizations. 
 
First, if both parties have unequal strength in a constituency and both the political 
parties perceive that cloning is unlikely to change the outcome but will 
unnecessarily inflate the cost, then cloning may not take place at all. In this 
model, both the political parties cannot float unlimited number of independent 
candidates due to budget constraints. They will float clone candidates only if they 
are within budget and floating such candidates changes the probability of winning 
in their favor. Common sense suggests that cloning battles will take place when 
both the parties perceive that they have equal or nearly equal strength in the 
constituency.   
 
Second, the same framework can be generalized to take care of “rebel” 
candidates. Political parties are not homogeneous entities. If a particular person 
in a political party is not selected as its candidate and decides to run as 
independent, the same candidate may be interpreted as a “clone” floated by the 
other political party at zero cost. 
 
Third, the way the model is posed, the game of floating clone independent 
candidates is a classic Prisoners‟ dilemma type game. Ideally, each political party 
would like to fight directly as it reduces its cost. However, any tacit understanding 
between the political parties is likely to be unstable. The incentive to “cheat” is 
strong, especially in political games of this type which is repeated infrequently 
and where the stake is high. Further, even if a tacit pact is there, if a free rider 
decides to take advantage of his/her similarity with one of the candidates, the 
fragile tacit pact may break down due to misunderstanding. 
 
Fourth, with three or more political parties having equal strength, the situation 
becomes more complex. Each political party will now have to field independent 
candidates against all its rivals. Generalizing this, when s parties are having 
equal committed vote shares and “neutral” voters vote for each political party with 
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probability (1/s), each of these s political parties will have to float “clones” for all 
its (s-1)   rivals. Like in the classical Prisoners‟ Dilemma with multiple players, 
detection of the cheater becomes even more difficult because even if “clones” 
are identified, one may not know which political party has floated the clone.  
   
Fifth, in this model, constituency size does not play any role. Rather, the 
important roles are played by the perceived “gap” between the winners and 
losers along with the budget constraints. To outsiders, the budget constraints 
would be unobservable. However, an observable implication of the model is that 
ceteris paribus, number of independent candidates will not vary for parliamentary 
and assembly elections. 
 
We now discuss the more general specifications involving covariates in the 
Poisson and the Negative Binomial model. In the presence of covariates, Yi, the 
number of independent candidates in constituency i may follow Poisson (i). 
Assume that i varies across constituencies in the following manner, viz., 
 
(6)  i = e
Zi 
 
where Zi is a K 1 vector of characteristics of the i-th constituency and  is the 
corresponding parameter vector.  
 
The log-likelihood function for the n constituencies is then written as: 
 
 

 
n
i
ii yey
1
)!ln()L()7( βZβ i
βZi  
 
The gradient and the Hessian can be written as: 
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The expressions in (8) and (9) reveal some special advantages of the 
specification in (6). First, an implication of equation (6) is that equation (8) 
becomes analogous to the more familiar normal equations in a standard 
regression specification. The regression property of this specification comes from 
the fact that E(Yi) = i, so that (Yi - i) may be interpreted as the residual. 
Second, the specification in equation (6) guarantees that the estimated value of 
i is always nonnegative, thus ensuring meaningful results (Hausman et al, 
1984).  
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Here, the parameter vector  is estimated by an iterative nonlinear weighted least 
squares method. Alternatively, the method of maximizing the likelihood function 
may also be used. Under some mild conditions, the likelihood function becomes 
globally concave and convergence takes place rapidly (Hausman et al, 1984). 
 
In case of Negative Binomial distribution, we specify  
 
(10)  i =  e
Zi 
 
Where Zi and  are as in (6). The log-likelihood function, the gradient and the 
Hessian are once again standard and the method of estimation of parameters is 
as in the case of the Poisson regression (Hausman et al, 1984).  
 
 
3 Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
The data for this paper have been downloaded and compiled from the website of 
the Election Commission of India (ECI) [http://www.eci.gov.in]. The ECI website 
contains detailed election results of all constituencies for all parliamentary 
elections in India. In this study, we focus on the year 2004 only. For each 
constituency, the name, age, sex, political affiliation and the number of votes 
obtained by each candidate have been recorded. For each candidate, we also 
know their caste status. In some cases, a constituency itself is declared a 
reserve constituency – sometimes for the schedules castes (SC) and sometimes 
for the scheduled tribes (ST). 
 
A difficulty encountered prior to empirical analysis is to define independent 
candidates empirically. While the election commission website and publications 
have an explicit category called “Independent”, many bizarre candidates stand in 
Indian elections under the garb of a political party.8 Election Commission 
publications list 173 parties categorized as “Registered (Unrecognised) Parties”, 
sometimes with strange names like Bharatiya Muhabbat Party (All India) or Vijeta 
Party. Together, these parties fielded a total of 898 candidates in the 
parliamentary election of 2004. The difficulty in defining an independent 
candidate arises because barring a few exceptions, majority of them did not join 
any coalition involving National or State parties. Therefore, for all practical 
purpose, majority of the candidates in this category behaved like independent 
candidates.9  Despite their presence, in this paper, we stick to the official Election 
Commission categorization of Independent candidates and do not add them to 
our list of independents. 
 
                                                 
8 The situation is not unique in case of India. Bizarre candidates stood under such labels as 
BELLS (Ban Every Licensing Law Society) or SBILP (Southport Back in Lancashire Party) in the 
1983 parliamentary election in the United Kingdom and could actually manage to get 75 and 374 
votes respectively (Moores, 1987). 
9
 Individually, only 8 among these 173 parties managed to get more than 0.10% of the total votes 
polled in the 2004 election.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Number of Candidates per Parliamentary Seat 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Series           Mean      Standard Deviation     Skewness      Kurtosis      Minimum       Maximum 
(1)              (2)               (3)                         (4)             (5)               (6)                (7) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
INDCAN         4.39              3.77                    1.89 (#)      6.74 (#)         0.00              30.00 
NONIND         5.62             2.25                    1.04 (#)      1.56 (#)         1.00              16.00 
TOTCAN       10.01             4.92                     1.30 (#)     3.04 (#)         2.00              35.00 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 1 compares the statistical features of independent (INDCAN), non-
independent (NONIND) and total number of candidates (TOTCAN) per 
constituency. Table 1 reveals that on average, a constituency in India had more 
than four independent candidates in the 2004 parliamentary election. This 
number is smaller than the average number of non-independent candidates per 
constituency. However, an important point to note is that if “Registered 
(Unrecognised) Parties” are considered as independent, then mean of INDCAN 
and NONIND would be 6.05 and 3.97 respectively.   
 
Table 2: Observed and Fitted Poisson and Negative Binomial Models 
 
INDCAN 
 
(1) 
Observed 
 
(2) 
Fitted Models 
Poisson 
(3) 
Negative Binomial 
(4) 
0 49 6.73 54.20 
1 67 29.56 73.44 
2 83 64.88 75.15 
3 77 94.95 68.58 
4 54 104.21 58.80 
5 41 91.49 48.46 
6 38 66.94 38.87 
7 45 41.98 30.56 
8 31 23.04 23.67 
9 13 11.24 18.11 
10 13 4.93 13.73 
11 9 1.97 10.32 
12 6 0.72 7.71 
> 12 17 0.36 21.40 
Log-Likelihood -1606.37 -1368.93 
 
 
Table 1 also shows that variation in the number of independent candidates is 
high. For example, Table 1 indicates that while some constituencies may not 
have independent candidates at all, in some there could be as many as 30 
independent candidates. In fact, Table 1 reveals that all important summarized 
measures other than mean (e.g., range, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis) are higher for INDCAN than for NONIND.  
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Table 2 analyzes the detailed distributional patterns of independent candidates. 
Column 2 of Table 2 provides the observed frequency distribution of the number 
of independent candidates.10 Column 3 provides the fitted Poisson model without 
any covariates. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 reveals a poor fit, with the 
value of the computed 2 statistic being 1235.33 whereas the critical value at 5.0 
per cent level of significance for 12 degrees of freedom being 21.03 only. This is 
because the distribution of independent candidates appears to have a long-tail. 
This concentration has led to the problem of “over-dispersion”. The variable 
INDCAN has a variance-mean ratio of 3.24. The high variance-mean ratio 
indicates that the basic Poisson model is not an appropriate probability model 
here and a more general model is needed. To that end, a simple negative 
binomial model has been fitted in column 4 of Table 2. A comparison of columns 
2 and 4 reveals a much closer fit. The value of the computed 2 statistic is only 
16.50 for the negative binomial model vis-à-vis a critical value of 19.68 at 5.0 per 
cent level of significance for 11 degrees of freedom. Therefore, Table 2 indicates 
that even a simple negative binomial model without any covariates would be able 
to explain the variations of independent candidates across constituencies 
reasonably well. 
 
We now examine to what extent the variation in INDCAN across constituencies 
could be explained through covariates. This is also important because it helps us 
to specify and test some hypotheses based on the analytical framework in 
Section 2. The first among them is that the number of independent candidates 
would typically be less in SC and ST constituencies. This is because the supply 
of potential independent candidates in such constituencies would be less. 
Second, the free riders would typically stand for election in “cities” and against 
the so called “VIP candidates”. Third, political fractionalization would be an 
important determinant of the number of independent candidates in a 
constituency.  
 
An important source of heterogeneity is the reservation status of the constituency 
itself. ECI data on candidates reveal that the numbers of independent candidates 
in General, SC and ST constituencies are 4.88, 3.30 and 1.44 on average.  
 
Another important source of variation in INDCAN would be the extent of 
urbanization in the constituency. Out of the 543 constituencies in the data set, 
some are predominantly rural, some are predominantly urban, and some are 
part-rural-and-part-urban. The rural-urban divide is also an important determinant 
of the number of independent candidates. In this paper, we have categorized 
constituencies based on the CCA and the HRA classification. The dummy 
variable METRO reflects the highest category and consists of six cities, viz., 
Delhi, Bombay, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad. Together, they 
                                                 
10
 It may be noted that the frequency distribution is truncated so that observed frequencies for 
each cell are at least 5 so that they can be used to compute goodness-of fit. 
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consist of 26 parliamentary seats.11 The TIER II cities are the cities listed as 
category B cities in both CCA and HRA classification. Seven constituencies 
match with these cities and are included in this category. These are: 
Ahmedabad, Pune, Kanpur, Surat, Jaipur, Lucknow and Nagpur. TIER III cities 
are the category C and D cities in India in terms of CCA and HRA classification. 
Together, they span 35 constituencies.
12
 All remaining constituencies are 
categorized as OTHERS.  It is interesting to note that while OTHERS 
constituencies have only 3.99 independent candidates on average, similar 
figures for TIER III, TIER II and METRO cities are 5.97, 8.57 and 8.41 
respectively.  
 
Empirically, the constitution of the variable VIP is not straightforward. The 
variable VIP consists of the constituencies when a candidate in that constituency 
satisfies any one of the following conditions: 
 A cabinet minister in the current or in the immediately preceding cabinet 
(MINS) 
 A son or a daughter of an “influential” political family (SONS) 
 Celebrities (Filmstars, artists, players etc.) (CELEBS) 
Our data set identifies a total of 78 such VIP constituencies.  Appendix A 
presents the list of such constituencies along with the VIP candidate.  
 
We note that constituencies with a VIP candidate typically have about 2 more 
independent candidates compared to non-VIP constituencies. Interestingly, if one 
considers the constituencies for the leader and the deputy leader of the 
incumbent government (A. B. Vajpayee in Lucknow and L.K. Advani in 
Gandhinagar) as well as the opposition (Sonia Gandhi in Rae Bareli and Rahul 
Gandhi in Amethi respectively), these four constituencies have 18, 8, 9 and 7 
independent candidates respectively.  
 
In this study, the fractionalization in a constituency is measured in two ways. In 
India, States are one of the major units. We identify the average number of non-
independent candidates in a state as an indicator of political fractionalization in 
the state itself (AVNONIND). The deviation of the number of non-independent 
candidates in a constituency from this state-level average (CONSTITUT) is also 
used as a measure of fractionalization of polity in the constituency itself. The 
correlation coefficient between INDCAN and AVNONIND is 0.30 and that 
between INDCAN and CONSTITUT is 0.10.  
 
Finally, the average number of independent candidates also fluctuates widely 
across States. For example, the average number of independent candidates in 
                                                 
11
 It may be noted that we have also included a few congested suburbs (e.g., Jadavpur and Dum 
Dum in case of Kolkata) as parts of these metros. In case of Hyderabad and Kolkata, their twin 
counterparts (e.g., Secundrabad and Howrah respectively) have also been included as METRO 
constituencies. 
12
 Appendix A presents the detailed lists of constituencies belonging to METRO, TIER II and 
TIER III. 
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the state of Tamil Nadu is as high as 10.02, more than double the all-India 
average. Our analytical framework suggests that political parties may sometimes 
engage in floating “clone” independent candidates to confuse the voter. A 
particular way of confusing the voter is to have candidates with the same name. 
It appears that this practice had been more prevalent in the state of Tamil Nadu, 
due to certain features in Hindu Tamil naming convention. That is why Tamil 
Nadu is being treated as a separate and somewhat anomalous case. The 
dummy TN reflects constituencies in the state of Tamil Nadu.  
 
Table 3: Estimated Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression Models 
     
Variables 
Poisson Negative Binomial 
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
Intercept 0.1191 1.60       0.0958 0.88       
SC -0.3682 -5.37 *** -0.3568 -3.49 *** 
ST -0.9040 -7.40 *** -0.9020 -6.06 *** 
Metro 0.4875 7.87 *** 0.4832 3.78 *** 
Tier 2 0.6785 6.27 *** 0.6840 2.88 *** 
Tier 3 0.2619 4.48 *** 0.2942 2.92 *** 
VIP 0.1349 3.31 *** 0.1356 1.94 *   
AVNONIND 0.2098 18.28 *** 0.2126 11.55 *** 
CONSTITUT 0.0157 1.57          0.0138 0.79      
TN 1.1791 27.03 *** 1.1806 12.96 *** 
DELTA     7.6204 6.30 *** 
Log-Likelihood -1503.1504 -1213.5400 
Sample Size 543 543 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1.0, 5.0 and 10.0 per cent level of  
significance only. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the fitted Poisson and Negative Binomial models. 
Results in Table 3 are consistent with the descriptive data analysis. All the 
coefficients have expected signs. Further, except the intercept and the variable 
CONSTITUT, all other estimated coefficients turn out to be statistically significant 
in case of both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial model. A point to note is 
that the common coefficients of both Poisson and Negative Binomial models are 
close in Table 3. As these common coefficients attempt to explain the mean, this 
is not surprising. 
 
Results in Table 3 help us to identify three major factors behind variations in the 
number of independent candidates. First, a major determinant of the number of 
independent candidates is political fractionalization. Results suggest that the 
number of non-independent candidates would typically lead to more independent 
candidates in the fray. Interestingly, t-statistics of the estimated coefficients in 
Table 3 point out that in so far as the impact of fractionalization is concerned, the 
major determinant appears to be fractionalization at the State level rather than at 
the constituency itself. Second, we find some indirect evidence of presence of 
free riders. Free riders typically stand in urban constituencies and against the so 
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called VIP candidates. Third, our results suggest that SC and ST constituencies 
would have typically lower number of independent candidates due to lack of 
potential candidates as compared to general constituencies. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Observed and the Fitted Models
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Figure 1 presents the actual and the fitted models. Figure 1 reveals a close fit of 
the Negative Binomial model to the data. Expectedly, the Negative Binomial 
model provides a much better fit than the Poisson model. Both the models are 
improvements over their simpler counterparts in Table 2. However, interestingly 
the gain in terms of log-likelihood for the Negative Binomial model in Table 3 is 
small vis-à-vis its simple counterpart in Table 2. In general, the estimated t-
statistics for the coefficients in the negative binomial model also turn out to be 
smaller than those of the Poisson model. Together, they imply that even the 
simple Negative Binomial model in Table 2 would be a reasonably good model to 
begin with. 
 
For more rigorous goodness of fit measures, the standard test is the chi-square 
test, which compares the observed and the expected probabilities of the cells in 
the model. However, here the possible values taken by the variable is not high, 
although there are ten and eleven parameters in the Poisson and the Negative 
Binomial model respectively. Therefore, chi-square test cannot be conducted for 
the combined sample. One can of course increase the number of cells by 
separately looking across various covariate groups. However, the total number of 
possible covariate combinations is around one hundred. Hence, there will be 
many cells with only a few observations and this will make the chi-square test 
invalid. We, therefore, measure goodness of fit by other criteria. 
 
  
18 
To measure the goodness of fit rigorously, we consider an alternative approach 
followed by Cooil (1991) in which the distributional assumption is checked 
directly by seeing whether the models are able to generate the right predictive 
frequencies for each covariate group. Let pj be the observed proportion of 
constituencies with j independent candidates. We define the corresponding 
model estimates as the average unconditional predictive probabilities 
 
)(ˆˆ)11(
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
   
Here )(ˆ jfi  is the estimated conditional probability that constituency i, the number 
of independent candidates is j. These probabilities are averaged across all 
constituencies.  
 
Following Cooil (1991), two measures of goodness of fit are considered to 
compare the performance of the proposed models: 
 The proportional prediction error (PPE0) which gives the relative error in fit 
corresponding to the probability of zero jumps, i.e., 
0
00
0
ˆ
|ˆ|
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  
 The total absolute prediction error (TAPE) in estimation, i.e., 
|ˆ|TAPE)13( j
j
j pp   
 
For both the Poisson and the Negative Binomial models, the measures of PPE0 
and TAPE are reported in Table 4 respectively. 
 
Table 4: Measures of Goodness of Fit 
      
  
Simple With Covariates 
Poisson Negative Binomial Poisson Negative Binomial 
PPE0 6.29 0.10 0.68 0.20 
TAPE 0.53 0.15 0.19 0.13 
 
 
From Table 4 it is clear that the negative binomial model provides a better fit to 
the data. While the values of TAPE for the Poisson model is 0.19, the 
corresponding range for the negative binomial model is about 0.13. The Poisson 
model grossly underestimates the probability of zero independent candidates and 
overestimates that of one candidate. Compared to the Poisson model, the 
performance of negative binomial model is far more superior. The error in 
estimation in the probability of no independent candidate is small for negative 
binomial candidates, as is being reflected by the values of PPE0 from Table 4. 
The tail probabilities are also better estimated by the negative binomial model as 
the problem of over-dispersion is more prominent.  
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To examine the stability of the estimates, we carry out a small bootstrap analysis. 
We randomly divide constituencies into two parts Subsamples (S-S) 1 and 2 
respectively and estimate the model separately for each of the two subsamples. 
This exercise is replicated four times. 
 
Table 5: Results on Bootsrap 
         
  
Bootsrtap 1 Bootstrap 2 Bootstrap 3 Bootstrap 4 
S-S 1.1 S-S 1.2 S-S 2.1 S-S 2.2 S-S 3.1 S-S 3.2 S-S 4.1 S-S 4.2 
Intercept -0.11 0.31 0.27 -0.04 0.15 0.01 0.26 -0.04 
SC -0.40 -0.33 -0.41 -0.31 -0.37 -0.34 -0.30 -0.44 
ST -0.71 -1.08 -0.89 -0.91 -0.70 -1.12 -1.10 -0.75 
Metro 0.55 0.41 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.41 0.43 0.62 
Tier 2 1.02 0.55 0.71 0.65 0.85 0.63 #0.66 #0.66 
Tier 3 0.46 0.18 0.32 0.11 #0.32 #0.29 0.33 0.23 
VIP 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.20 #0.14 #0.15 
AVNONIND 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.23 #0.21 #0.22 0.19 0.24 
CONSTITUT 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 
TN 1.32 1.08 1.11 1.24 1.15 1.22 #1.16 #1.16 
DELTA 9.64 6.87 8.99 6.95 9.01 6.94 10.99 6.05 
Log-Likelihood -589.09 -620.06 -618.02 -591.65 -608.10 -602.23 -593.47 -615.80 
Sample Size 272 271 272 271 272 271 272 271 
Notes:  
1. S-S i.j reflects results based on the data in Subsample 1 in the first random allocation exercise. 
2. Here, # before the estimated coefficients (in bold font) in bootstrap i (i=1,2,,3,4) indicates that the 
corresponding coefficient does not lie between the interval created by the estimated coefficients in 
S-S 1 and S-S 2 for that bootstrap.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of the bootstrap exercise. Table 5 reflects that in 
each case, the estimated coefficients are of the same sign with the 
corresponding coefficients in Table 3 and are close to them in general. In 
general, the estimated coefficients in Table 3 lie between the intervals created by 
the corresponding coefficients in a particular bootstrap. Even in a few cases 
where an estimated coefficient in Table 3 does not lie in the corresponding 
interval in a bootstrap, either the interval is too narrow or the coefficient in 
Table 3 misses the interval narrowly.   
 
Table 6 presents the in-sample and out-of sample forecast performances based 
on the bootstrap sub-samples. Once again, as in Table 4, the focus is on the 
statistics PPE0 and TAPE. In sample PPE0‟s  and TAPE‟s are calculated based 
on the estimated parameters of a sub-sample on the observed values in that sub-
sample. Out-of-sample measures, in contrast, are computed using the 
observations in the other sub-sample as the actual ones. 
 
Table 6 reveals that the computed out-of-sample TAPE statistic has fluctuated 
between 0.0779 and 0.2660, with median values in the range of 0.17–0.18. 
These values are reasonable and together they imply that the model will not be 
affected too much by sampling fluctuation. The average in-sample TAPE value in 
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Table 6 is also in the range of 0.17–0.18. It may be noted that in Table 4, 
negative binomial model with covariates yielded a TAPE value of about 0.13 for 
the whole data.  
 
In-sample and out-of-sample PPE0 values are also reasonable, though in one or 
two cases the values obtained are on the higher side. The goodness of fit 
statistics obtained from bootstrap forecast measures therefore enhance the 
credibility of the model.        
 
 
 
Table 6: In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Forecast Performance of the 
Negative Binomial Model for Different Bootstrap Sub-Samples 
      
Bootstrap and 
Subsamples 
In Sample Out of Sample 
PPE0 TAPE PPE0 TAPE 
Bootstrap 1 
S-S 1.1 0.0037 0.1713 0.1597 0.2029 
S-S 1.2 0.4233 0.2510 0.2318 0.2660 
Bootstrap 2 
S-S 2.1 0.1678 0.2238 0.2373 0.2600 
S-S 2.2 0.2043 0.1260 0.8439 0.1849 
Bootstrap 3 
S-S 3.1 0.2828 0.2019 0.0061 0.1710 
S-S 3.2 0.1236 0.1479 0.4501 0.1725 
Bootstrap 4 
S-S 4.1 0.2017 0.1497 0.0407 0.1442 
S-S 4.2 0.1765 0.2045 0.3584 0.0779 
 
 
4 Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
It may be noted that the political game of cloning independent candidates is a 
classic prisoners‟ dilemma game leading to a loss-loss situation for all. From 
social perspective, emergence of too many independent candidates is perhaps 
not a healthy sign in a democracy. Political scientists have suggested different 
policies to prevent the emergence of independent candidates in elections. Some, 
especially in the context of the US, have actually been implemented.  
 
Although these policies vary in detail, the underlying idea is to increase the 
transaction cost of the independent candidate to a level so that competing in an 
election becomes “unprofitable”. Some of these policies like disaffiliation etc. 
require open access to political party membership data and are not feasible in 
the context of emerging market economies. However, others like increasing 
deposit or signature requirements have more potential in developing countries.  
 
A few policies in the Indian context could be:  
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 To barr entry as independent candidate in parliamentary elections unless 
the candidate has demonstrable success in earlier local or assembly 
elections.13  
 Another approach could be to empower the Election Commission to 
impose a differential deposit scheme for different types of constituencies 
(e.g., as the problem due to free riders is more in urban constituencies, 
deposit money charged for these constituencies could be more) in so far 
as independent candidates are concerned.  
 Given the incentive structure in the political game, it is also necessary to 
examine the detailed asset data and income tax returns of all independent 
candidates for a few subsequent years after participation in elections. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The paper attempted to explain the emergence of independent candidates in 
Indian parliamentary election in the year 2004. Independent candidates in a 
constituency being a count variable, a natural starting point in this case was to 
specify and estimate Poisson and Negative Binomial models and their 
generalizations.  While many studies in the past modeled count data in this way, 
in most such studies, specification of Poisson and Negative Binomial models 
were ad hoc and were based on statistical convenience. In this study, however, 
attempts were made to show through a simple behavioral model why the 
distribution of independent candidates could be Negative Binomial.  
 
We showed that in a first-past-the-post electoral system, political parties have the 
incentive to float independent candidates who would “clone” their major rivals. In 
a fragmented political milieu, such behavior would lead to a simultaneous-move 
game where each party tries to guess the number of independent candidates that 
would be pitted against it by others. We proposed that in this game where 
political parties try to out-maneuver one another, the perceived probability 
distribution of the number of independent candidates floated against one political 
party by another would be “memoryless”. Using this property and a few more 
simplifying assumptions, we showed that the total number of independent 
candidates across constituencies would follow a Negative Binomial distribution.  
 
Our empirical results revealed that the distribution of independent candidates in 
India could be explained well with a Negative Binomial probability model. Our 
results also highlighted the roles three major factors played in the emergence of 
independent candidates. First, a major determinant of the number of independent 
candidates was political fractionalization. As suggested by our theory, empirical 
analysis revealed that more number of non-independent candidates in a 
constituency would typically lead to more number of independent candidates. 
Interestingly, results pointed out that in case of India, the major determinant was 
                                                 
13
 Independent candidates may directly enter as a candidate in a Parliamentary election with the support of 
a political party. 
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the political fractionalization at the State level rather than at the level of the 
constituency. Second, we found some indirect evidence of the presence of free 
riders. Free riders, typically “picking their spots”, stood in the metropolitan and 
Tier II constituencies and chose to fight against the so called VIP and celebrity 
candidates. Third, our results indicated that SC and ST constituencies had lower 
number of independent candidates, because potential independent candidates 
were much less in these constituencies compared to unreserved ones. 
 
The problem addressed in this paper and the issues raised are not just relevant 
for India, but for all democracies. Even in older democracies in developed 
countries, competition among the two mainstream parties could sometimes 
create a political vacuum leading to the emergence of a third party (e.g., Liberal 
Democrats in case of the UK) or independent candidates (e.g., Ross Perot in 
case of the US). Our results indicate that such situations may lead to the 
emergence of more independent candidates. Some of these candidates could be 
floated discreetly by the mainstream political parties to clone their rivals.  
Because of the nature of the incentives of the political parties, first-past-the-post 
electoral systems are especially susceptible to such phenomena.  Such electoral 
systems, therefore, need to put appropriate institutional constraints in place. The 
institutional constraints could be different for different countries. However, the 
main idea behind them is to increase the transaction cost of smaller parties and 
independent candidates.      
 
It may be noted that in this paper, we have maintained the formal distinction of 
small political parties and independent candidates in India. As candidates of 
many small parties in India behave like independents, one may treat them as 
independents. However, incentives of smaller parties, especially if they take part 
in more than one constituency, may be more general and not necessarily 
focused on a particular constituency. Working with them, therefore, brings many 
complex issues like coalition formation in a democracy. However, despite all 
these, we need to know whether their inclusion in independents would change 
some of the main results obtained in this paper. 
 
Finally, while the paper could give some justification of applying negative 
binomial model through “cloning”, a major weakness of the paper is that the 
converse may not be true. Fit of the Negative Binomial model does indicate 
heterogeneity and over-dispersion in the spatial distribution of independent 
candidates but provides no direct evidence of cloning. Our theories are based on 
incentives and empirical results are based on circumstantial evidence rather than 
rigorous proof. However, given the widespread actual existence of “strange 
bedfellows” in politics across countries and over time, more research are needed 
on the emergence of independent candidates in a political game.    
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Appendix A: Data Definitions 
 
A.1  List of VIP Constituencies along with the VIP Candidate 
 
01. Karimnagar, K. CHANDRA SHAKHER RAO (Sic!)  02. Khammam, RENUKA CHOWDHURY; 03. 
Miryalguda, JAIPAL REDDY SUDINI; 04. Silchar, SONTOSH MOHAN DEV; 05. Gauhati, BHUPEN 
HAZARIKA; 06. Hajipur, RAM VILAS PASWAN; 07. Vaishali, RAGHUBANSH PRASAD SINGH; 08. 
Muzaffarpur, GEORGE FERNANDES; 09. Barh, NITISH KUMAR; 10. Madhepura, LALU PRASAD & 
SHARAD YADAV; 11. Kishanganj, SYED SHAHNAWAZ HUSSAIN; 12. Begusarai, ; 13. Patna, C. 
P. THAKUR; 14. Sasaram, MIRA KUMAR; 15. Gandhinagar, L. K. ADVANI; 16. Kapadvanj, 
VAGHELA SHANKERSINH LAXMANSINH; 17. Surat, KASHIRAM RANA; 18. Kurukshetra, NAVEEN 
JINDAL & ABHAY SINGH CHAUTALA; 19. Kangra, SHANTA KUMAR; 20. Srinagar, OMAR ABDULLAH; 
21. Anantnag, MEHBOOBA MUFTI; 22. Bangalore_S, ANANTH KUMAR; 23. Mangalore, M 
VEERAPPA MOILY; 24. Hassan, H. D. DEVEGOWDA; 25. Shimoga, S. BANGARAPPA; 26. Guna, 
JYOTIRADITYA MADHAVRAO SCINDIA; 27. Chhindwara, KAMALNATH; 28. Ujjain, DR. 
SATYANARAYAN JATIYA; 29. Rajapur, SURESH PRABHAKAR PRABHU; 30. Mumbai_S, MILIND 
MURLI DEORA; 31. Mumbai_NC, MANOHAR GAJANAN JOSHI; 32. Mumbai_NW, SUNIL DUTT; 
33. Mumbai_N, GOVINDA; 34. Latur, PATIL SHIVRAJ VISHWANATH; 35. Pune, KALMADI SURESH; 
36. Shillong, SANBOR SWELL LYNGDOH; 37. Sundargarh, JUAL ORAM; 38. Gurdaspur, VINOD 
KHANNA; 39. Amritsar, NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU; 40. Bikaner, DHARMENDRA; 41. Churu, BAL RAM 
JAKHAR; 42. Jhunjhunu, SHISH RAM OLA; 43. Dausa, SACHIN PILOT; 44. Jhalwar, DUSHYANT 
SINGH; 45. Jalore, BUTA SINGH; 46. Madras_C, DAYANIDHI MARAN; 47. Madras_S, BAALU, T. 
R.; 48. Perambalur, RAJA, A.; 49. Mayiladuturai, MANI SHANKAR AIYAR; 50. Sivaganga, 
CHIDAMBARAM, P.; 51. Rampur, P. JAYA PRADA NAHATA; 52. Pilibhit, MANEKA GANDHI; 53. 
Lucknow, ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE; 54. RaeBareli, SONIA GANDHI; 55. Amethi, RAHUL GANDHI; 
56. Akbarpur, MAYA WATI; 57. Bansgaon, MAHAVEER PRASAD; 58. Ballia, CHANDRA 
SHEKHAR; 59. Allahabad, DR. MURALI MANOHAR JOSHI; 60. Kannauj, AKHILESH YADAV; 61. 
Mainpuri, MULAYAM SINGH YADAV; 62. Raiganj, PRIYA RANJAN DASMUNSI; 63. Malda, A. B. A. 
GHANI KHAN CHOUDHURY; 64. Jangipur, PRANAB MUKHERJEE; 65. Calcutta_S, MAMATA 
BANERJEE; 66. Bolpur, CHATTERJEE SOMNATH; 67. Mahasamund, AJIT JOGI; 68. Dumka, 
SHIBU SOREN; 69. Ranchi, SUBODH KANT SAHAY; 70. Khunti, ; 71. Hazaribagh, YASHWANT 
SINHA; 72. New Delhi, JAGMOHAN; 73. Outer Delhi, SAJJAN KUMAR & SAHIB SINGH; 74. East 
Delhi, SANDEEP DIKSHIT; 75. Chandni Chowk, KAPIL SIBAL & SMRITI Z. IRAANI; 76. Delhi 
Sadar, JAGDISH TYTLER; 77. Lakshadweep, P. M. SAYEED; 78. Pondicherry, LALITHA 
KUMARAMANGALAM; 
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A.2 Details on Metropolitan, Tier II and Tier III Constituencies 
 
Table A.2: Metropolitan, Tier II and Tier III Constituencies 
   
Constituency 
Category 
(1) 
Constituencies 
 
(2) 
Metro 
[26] 
Hyderabad, Secunderabad, Bangalore North, Bangalore South, Mumbai 
South, Mumbai South-Central, Mumbai North-Central, Mumbai North-
East, Mumbai North West, Mumbai North, Madras North, Madras Central, 
Madras South, Jadavpur, Dum Dum, Calcutta North-West, Calcutta North-
East, Calcutta South, Howrah, New Delhi, South Delhi, Outer Delhi, East 
Delhi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi Sadar, Karol Bagh, 
Tier II 
[7] 
Ahmedabad, Surat, Nagpur, Pune, Jaipur, Lucknow, Kanpur 
Tier III 
[35] 
Vishakhapatnam, Vijayawada, Guntur, Gauhati, Patna, Rajkot, Baroda, 
Srinagar, Mysore, Mangalore, Trivandrum, Gwalior, Jabalpur, Bhopal, 
Indore, Nashik, Aurangabad, Sholapur, Bhubaneswar, Amritsar, 
Jullundur, Ludhiana, Jodhpur, Coimbatore, Madurai, Tiruchirapalli, 
Varanasi, Allahabad, Agra, Asansol, Durg, Dhanbad, Ranchi, 
Jamshedpur, Chandigarh. 
Note: Numbers within third bracket in Column 1 indicate total number of such constituencies in Column 2. 
 
